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A “New Trade” Theory of GATT/WTO
Negotiations
Ralph Ossa
University of Chicago and National Bureau of Economic Research
I suggest a novel theory of GATT/WTO negotiations based on Krug-
man’s “new trade” model. It emphasizes international production re-
locations and is easy to calibrate to bilateral trade data. Focusing on
the major players in recent GATT/WTO negotiations, I find that it
implies reasonable noncooperative tariffs as well as moderate gains
from GATT/WTO negotiations.
I. Introduction
International trade has been liberalized dramatically since the end of
World War II as a result of multilateral trade negotiations governed by
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor
the World Trade Organization (WTO). According to WTO statistics,
industrialized countries have cut their tariffs on industrial products by
an average 36 percent during the first five GATT rounds (1942–62), an
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average 37 percent in the Kennedy Round (1964–67), an average 33
percent in the Tokyo Round (1973–79), and an average 38 percent in
the Uruguay Round (1986–94).1
While the case for free trade provides good reasons for applauding
this impressive success of GATT/WTO negotiations, it also makes the
nature of these negotiations difficult to understand. Why do countries
need to negotiate over tariff reductions? And what is the role played by
the GATT/WTO’s institutional design?
These questions have motivated what can be called the standard neo-
classical theory of GATT/WTO negotiations. This theory invokes the
classic optimal tariff argument, which is that countries impose import
tariffs in order to gain at the expense of other countries by manipulating
their terms of trade. It originates in the work of Johnson (1953–54),
who demonstrates that countries are trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma
if they set optimal tariffs noncooperatively. It culminates in the work of
Bagwell and Staiger (1999), who show that the GATT/WTO principles
of reciprocity and nondiscrimination can be interpreted as simple ne-
gotiation rules that help countries escape this prisoner’s dilemma.2 The
principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination are usually considered
to be the essence of the GATT/WTO’s institutional design. Generally
speaking, the former advises that tariff changes keep changes in imports
equal across trading partners and the latter requires that the same tariff
must be applied against all trading partners for any given traded
product.3
For all its merits, this standard theory has two important limitations.
First, it predicts that GATT/WTO negotiations should revolve solely
around the issue of terms-of-trade manipulation, which seems implau-
sible to many observers of real-world trade negotiations. Krugman (1997,
113), for example, finds the optimal tariff argument so irrelevant to
actual disputes over trade policy that he even concludes that one cannot
make economic sense of GATT/WTO negotiations at all. Such concerns
are somewhat alleviated by recent work of Broda, Limao, and Weinstein
1 There is some controversy about the scope of GATT/WTO negotiations. Rose (2004)
finds that GATT/WTO members did not benefit more from GATT/WTO negotiations
than nonmembers. However, Subramanian and Wei (2007) and Tomz, Goldstein, and
Rivers (2007) argue that this finding is not robust.
2 See Bagwell and Staiger (2002) for a detailed account of the standard neoclassical
theory of GATT/WTO negotiations. An alternative theory of trade agreements was offered
by Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998). It stresses commitment considerations, pointing
out that trade agreements may help governments commit vis-a`-vis domestic special-interest
groups. It differs fundamentally both from the standard terms-of-trade theory of GATT/
WTO negotiations and from the new trade theory of GATT/WTO negotiations developed
in this paper in that it does not view trade negotiations as a means to internalize an
international trade policy externality.
3 I adopt here Bagwell and Staiger’s (1999) interpretation of the principles of reciprocity
and nondiscrimination, which I will discuss in more detail later on.
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(2008) and Bagwell and Staiger (forthcoming), which suggests that
terms-of-trade considerations could play a role in governments’ tariff
choices. Yet it is hard to escape the fact that the optimal tariff argument
is all but absent from the rhetoric of trade policy makers, which is starkly
at odds with the exclusive role it ought to play.
Second, it is based on conventional neoclassical trade models, which
are difficult to calibrate convincingly, so that little is known about its
quantitative implications. This is unfortunate since many important
questions are of a quantitative type. For example, are the noncooperative
tariffs broadly consistent with the noncooperative tariffs observed during
the tariff war following the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930? And how
large are the welfare gains from GATT/WTO negotiations?
In this paper, I suggest a novel theory of GATT/WTO negotiations
that is not subject to these limitations of the standard theory. My main
idea is to depart from the conventional neoclassical trade model and
instead build on a Krugman (1980) “new trade” model.4
I first show that in a Krugman (1980) environment, GATT/WTO
negotiations governed by the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrim-
ination can be interpreted as helping governments internalize a pro-
duction relocation externality. In my model, a production relocation
externality arises because countries can use import tariffs to gain at the
expense of other countries by attracting a larger share of manufacturing
production. While trade policy makers are assumed to maximize do-
mestic welfare in the model, their tariff choices are exactly as if they
maximized the number of domestic manufacturing firms. And since the
number of domestic manufacturing firms translates directly into the
number of domestic manufacturing jobs, this is equivalent to maximiz-
ing the number of domestic manufacturing jobs. In contrast to the
terms-of-trade case for protection, these motivations seem immediately
consistent with real-world trade policy debates.
I then demonstrate that my model can be calibrated using an exten-
sion of the technique developed by Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2007).
An attractive feature of this technique is that it relies directly on bilateral
trade data and requires estimates of only a few parameters. Focusing
on the six major players in recent GATT/WTO negotiations, I find that
the predicted noncooperative tariffs have the same order of magnitude
as the tariffs observed during the tariff war following the Smoot-Hawley
4 While the argument can be made most cleanly in the context of the simple Krugman
(1980) model, it generalizes to more complicated environments. For example, all results
can also be derived in a variant of the Arkolakis et al. (2008) version of Melitz (2003), as
I discuss in detail in a separate appendix, which is available on request.
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Tariff Act of 1930.5 I also find that the predicted welfare losses from
moving to noncooperative tariffs are moderate and never exceed 35
percent of the predicted welfare losses from moving to autarky for any
country in any specification.
While I am, I believe, the first to study trade negotiations in a new
trade model, I am by no means the first to study trade policy in such
a model. It is well known that in Krugman (1980) type environments,
import tariffs generally have production relocation and terms-of-trade
effects. Venables (1987) was the first to develop a version of the Krugman
model that isolates production relocation effects. Gros (1987) was the
first to develop a version of the Krugman model that isolates terms-of-
trade effects.6 Essentially, the positive profits made by domestic manu-
facturers as a result of import tariffs can be competed away either
through entry, leading to a production relocation effect, or through an
increase in wages, leading to a terms-of-trade effect. The relative strength
of these two effects is determined by the elasticity of the labor supply
curve facing the manufacturing sector as a whole. Models with freely
traded homogeneous nonmanufacturing goods generate a perfectly
elastic labor supply curve and therefore isolate production relocation
effects. Models without nonmanufacturing goods at all generate a per-
fectly inelastic labor supply curve and therefore isolate terms-of-trade
effects. Intermediate cases can be constructed with freely or costly traded
differentiated nonmanufacturing goods.
In order to emphasize the novel features of my new trade theory of
GATT/WTO negotiations, I focus on the case with only a production
relocation effect. In Section II, I lay out the basic model and explain
how GATT/WTO negotiations governed by the principles of reciprocity
and nondiscrimination can be interpreted as helping governments in-
ternalize a production relocation externality. I keep this analysis delib-
erately stark with the purpose of clearly conveying my qualitative point.
In Section III, I then calibrate a more realistic version of the basic model
and present my quantitative results.
5 In particular, I focus on Brazil, China, the European Union, India, Japan, and the
United States since these countries are typically considered to be the main players in
GATT/WTO negotiations. I aggregate all other countries into a seventh trade bloc referred
to as the rest of the world.
6 Venables (1987) studies unilateral trade policy only. Gros (1987) studies unilateral
trade policy and also characterizes the noncooperative trade policy equilibrium. Neither
Venables nor Gros considers trade negotiations. My paper is also related to the analysis
of Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2000), who study Venables-type trade policy effects in an
economic geography model. They show that symmetric liberalization between asymmetric
countries leads to international firm relocations from the small to the large country. They
also show that the large country needs to liberalize faster than the small country if inter-
national firm relocations are to be prevented. See also Baldwin et al. (2003).
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II. Basic Model
In this section, I lay out the basic model and explain how GATT/WTO
negotiations governed by the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrim-
ination can be interpreted as helping governments internalize a pro-
duction relocation externality. I first focus on a two-country case to
highlight the role played by the principle of reciprocity. I then move
to a three-country extension to shed light on the role played by the
principle of nondiscrimination.
A. Two-Country Case: GATT/WTO and Reciprocity
1. Setup
There are two countries, 1 and 2. Consumers have access to a continuum
of differentiated manufacturing goods and a single homogeneous non-
manufacturing good. Preferences over these goods are identical across
countries. They are given by the following utility functions:
mj/(j1)ni2
(j1)/j 1mU p m (u) du Y , (1)j  ij i i j[ ]
ip1 0
where is the quantity of a manufacturing good from country i con-mij
sumed in country j, is the quantity of the nonmanufacturing goodYj
consumed in country j, is the “number” of manufacturing goodsni
produced in country i, is the elasticity of substitution betweenj 1 1
manufacturing goods, and m is the share of income spent on manufac-
turing goods. Technologies are also identical in both countries. They
are summarized by the following (inverse) production functions:
M Ml p f cq , (2)j j
Y Yl p q , (3)j j
where is the labor requirement for producing units of a manu-M Ml qj j
facturing good in country j, is the labor requirement for producingYl j
units of the nonmanufacturing good in country j, f denotes the fixedYqj
labor requirement of manufacturing production, and c denotes the mar-
ginal labor requirement of manufacturing production. The manufac-
turing good market is monopolistically competitive whereas the non-
manufacturing good market is perfectly competitive.
Tariffs are introduced as a component of “iceberg” trade costs that
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apply only to international manufacturing trade.7 For one unit of a
manufacturing good from country i to arrive in country j, unitsv(1 t )ij
must be shipped and the remainder “melts away” in transit, where v 1
is a transport cost and is the tariff imposed by country j against1 t ≥ 0ij
imports from country i. To economize on notation, I denote t {ij
. Notice that, modeled this way, tariffs do not generate any reve-1 tij
nue. This assumption is essential for the model’s tractability but naturally
restricts tariffs to be nonnegative. The results presented in this section
of the paper are therefore best compared to a version of the standard
neoclassical model of GATT/WTO negotiations in which tariffs are also
restricted to be nonnegative. I discuss the implications of allowing for
revenue-generating tariffs in the context of the quantitative analysis in
Section III.
Motivated by the fact that import tariffs have always been by far the
most important trade policy instruments in practice, my analysis ab-
stracts from export policy instruments. The tariff war following the
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 is an important case in point. It oc-
curred before the use of export policy instruments was constrained by
GATT/WTO regulations, suggesting that there are reasons why govern-
ments typically refrain from using them. I do not explore these reasons
in this paper but simply assume that import tariffs are the only available
trade policy instruments.8
I also make the following three additional assumptions: first, I restrict
to be finite so that overall, where is an arbitrarily larget t ≥ t ≥ 0 tij ij
but finite upper bound. This upper bound is just a technical conve-
nience. Removing it would complicate the exposition without changing
the results in any interesting way (see the Appendix for a detailed dis-
cussion of the consequences of letting ). Second, I assume thatt r 
7 As will become clear shortly, the production relocation effect is closely related to the
home market effect. Davis (1998) shows that in simple setups like the one developed here,
the home market effect disappears if outside good sector trade costs are sufficiently high.
However, Krugman and Venables (1999) demonstrate that this no longer holds in more
general environments. Essentially, all that is needed for the home market effect to survive
is a margin through which aggregate manufacturing employment can adjust.
8 Bagwell and Staiger (2009) have recently argued that this assumption is crucial to be
able to interpret the production relocation externality as a fundamental problem trade
agreements are designed to solve. Allowing for import and export policy instruments in
a framework similar to the one developed here, they show that the noncooperative equi-
librium is inefficient only because of export tax–induced terms-of-trade effects since all
import tariff–induced production relocation effects are exactly undone by export subsidy–
induced production relocation effects. Readers who are therefore uncomfortable with my
assumption should best view my analysis as an examination of the specific properties of
real-world trade negotiations. In particular, GATT article 16 prohibits export subsidies for
manufacturing goods, and the U.S. Constitution prohibits export taxes so that countries
have access only to an incomplete set of trade policy instruments in practice. Fundamental
problem or not, it seems important to understand the implications of this institutional
arrangement for the motivation of trade negotiators and the efficiency of trade negoti-
ations.
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the manufacturing sector is always active in both countries. This as-
sumption requires transport costs to be sufficiently large (see the Ap-
pendix for the precise restriction on v). It ensures that countries can
never attract all manufacturing firms through trade policy and thereby
eliminates uninteresting corner solutions. Finally, I assume that the non-
manufacturing good sector is always active in both countries. This as-
sumption requires the demand for manufacturing goods to be suffi-
ciently small (see the Appendix for the precise parameter restriction
on m in eq. [1]). It ensures, together with the assumptions made on
market structure, nonmanufacturing good technology, preferences, and
trade costs, that there is no role for terms-of-trade effects in this envi-
ronment. I comment further on this latter point below.
2. Solution for Given Trade Policy
I choose the price of the nonmanufacturing good as the numeraire,
which implies that wages are equal to one in both countries. The reason
is that the nonmanufacturing good sector is always active in both coun-
tries, the nonmanufacturing good market is perfectly competitive, and
the nonmanufacturing good is produced with unit efficiency everywhere
and is freely traded among countries. For given tariffs, the model’s
solution is then determined by the market-clearing conditions for man-
ufacturing firms in country 1 and country 2:
j j1 j 1j j1qp p G mL  p (vt ) G mL , (4)1 1 12 2 2
j 1j j1 j j1qp p (vt ) G mL  p G mL , (5)21 1 1 2 2
where are the break-even outputs determined by freeq{ f(j 1)/c
entry; are the ex–factory prices determined by profitp{ jc/(j 1)
maximization;
1j 1j 1/(1j)G { [n p  n (pvt ) ]1 1 2 21
and
1j 1j 1/(1j)G { [n (pvt )  n p ]2 1 12 2
are the ideal manufacturing price indices; and and are the num-L L1 2
bers of consumers or workers. Equations (4) and (5) can be solved
immediately for the equilibrium manufacturing price indices:
1/(j1)
j 1jqp 1 (vt )12G p , (6)1 1j[ ]mL 1 (vt vt )1 21 12
1/(j1)
j 1jqp 1 (vt )21G p . (7)2 1j[ ]mL 1 (vt vt )2 21 12
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If the definitions of the manufacturing price indices are substituted,
they can also be solved for the equilibrium numbers of manufacturing
firms:
1jm L L (vt )1 2 21n p  , (8)1 1j 1j[ ]qp 1 (vt ) 1 (vt )12 21
1jm L L (vt )2 1 12n p  . (9)2 1j 1j[ ]qp 1 (vt ) 1 (vt )21 12
Notice that this equilibrium has three special features. First, the world
number of manufacturing firms is constant since n  n p m(L 1 2 1
. Second, tariffs affect welfare only through the manufacturingL )/qp2
price indices since indirect utilities are given by .m 1m mV p m (1 m) L Gj j j
Finally, there can be no role for terms-of-trade effects since ex–factory
prices are independent of trade policy.9 These features all help to clarify
the argument but are not crucial for the main results.
3. Production Relocation Effect and Import Price Effect
Equations (6) and (7) reveal that each country’s price index is mono-
tonically decreasing in its own tariff regardless of the other country’s
tariff but monotonically increasing in the other country’s tariff regard-
less of the own tariff so that each country can always use trade policy
to gain at the other country’s expense. This trade policy externality is
brought about by a production relocation effect. In particular, a uni-
lateral increase in import tariffs makes foreign manufacturing goods
more expensive in the domestic market so that domestic consumers
shift expenditure toward domestic manufacturing goods. As a conse-
quence, domestic manufacturing firms sell more, thus making profits,
and foreign manufacturing firms sell less, thus making losses, which
triggers entry into the domestic manufacturing sector and exit out of
the foreign manufacturing sector, as is also reflected in equations (8)
and (9). This production relocation effect reduces the domestic price
index but increases the foreign price index since it reduces the share
of manufacturing goods consumed by domestic consumers, which is
subject to trade costs, but increases the share of manufacturing goods
9 I follow the literature in defining the terms of trade as the ratio of ex–factory prices,
which is equal to one in this model. One may object that this is too narrow a definition
since terms-of-trade effects should really operate through price indices in this environment.
I show below that, even if such a wider definition is adopted, my results still cannot be
interpreted as terms-of-trade effects.
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consumed by foreign consumers, which is subject to trade costs.10 While
this production relocation effect is the only channel through which
domestic tariffs affect foreign welfare, domestic welfare is also affected
by a counteracting but dominated import price effect. In particular,
domestic import tariffs also directly increase the domestic price index
by making still-imported manufacturing goods more expensive. The
reason why the production relocation effect always dominates the import
price effect can be best understood with the help of equations (4) and
(5). With foreign import tariffs held fixed, a unilateral increase in do-
mestic import tariffs initially increases the domestic price index because
of the import price effect, which increases sales and profits of domestic
firms. To restore equilibrium, there has to be entry into the domestic
manufacturing sector and exit out of the foreign manufacturing sector,
which reduces the domestic price index and increases the foreign price
index. This effect makes it harder for domestic firms to sell goods in
the domestic market but easier for domestic firms to sell goods in the
foreign market so that the domestic posttariff equilibrium price index
must be below its pretariff level. If it merely returned to its pretariff
level, domestic firms could still export more than before and would
therefore make positive profits.
4. Noncooperative Trade Policy
I now consider what happens if governments choose trade policy non-
cooperatively in an attempt to maximize their citizens’ welfare. While
welfare maximization is first and foremost a simplifying assumption, it
is actually more realistic than one might think. Maggi and Goldberg
(1999), for example, find that the weight of welfare in the government’s
objective function is many times larger than the weight of trade policy–
influencing campaign contributions.
Notice first that the noncooperative equilibrium is maximum protec-
tion. This result follows immediately from the fact that each country’s
10 Notice that the production relocation effect depends crucially on increasing returns
to scale. Essentially, it is a tariff-induced change in the pattern of specialization brought
about by changes in relative market size, which cannot arise in neoclassical environments.
Notice that the production relocation gain still could not be interpreted as a terms-of-
trade gain even if a price index–based definition of the terms of trade was adopted. The
reason is that country j’s terms of trade would then have to be defined as exp impG /G pj j
since is the world price index of country j’s manufacturing1/(1j) exp 1j 1/(1j)(n /n ) G p (n p )j i j j
exports and is the world price index of country j’s manufacturingimp 1j 1/(1j)G p (n p )j i
imports and would therefore deteriorate and not improve in country j’s tariff.
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price index is monotonically decreasing in its own tariff regardless of
the other country’s tariff and is stated more formally in lemma 1.11
Lemma 1. Suppose that governments choose tariffs simultaneously
in an attempt to maximize their citizens’ welfare. Then the unique Nash
equilibrium is .(t , t )p (t, t)21 12
Proof. Follows immediately from equations (6) and (7). QED
Observe second that a tariff combination is efficient if and only if the
tariff is zero in at least one of the countries. Intuitively, there always
exists a bilateral tariff reduction that reduces one country’s price index
without affecting the other country’s price index by appropriately bal-
ancing the import price effect and the production relocation effect.
However, bilateral tariff reductions are possible only if tariffs are positive
in both countries so that Pareto improvements cannot be achieved if
the tariff is zero in at least one of the countries.12
Lemma 2. The set of Pareto-efficient tariff combinations consists of
all such that either or or both.(t , t ) t p 0 t p 021 12 21 12
Proof. See the Appendix for a formal proof.
Thus, the noncooperative equilibrium is inefficient. While the details
of lemmas 1 and 2 clearly reflect specific modeling assumptions, this
result captures a first fundamental point: tariffs entail a production
relocation externality that governments fail to internalize when setting
tariffs noncooperatively. It is therefore stated as proposition 1.
Proposition 1. The noncooperative equilibrium is inefficient.
Proof. Follows immediately from lemmas 1 and 2. QED
5. Trade Policy under the GATT/WTO: The Principle of Reciprocity
I now contrast this noncooperative equilibrium with the outcome
achieved under the GATT/WTO principle of reciprocity as interpreted
by Bagwell and Staiger (1999). Generally speaking, the principle of
reciprocity advises that tariff changes keep changes in imports equal
across trading partners. However, this principle has two particular ap-
plications in GATT/WTO practice and is not binding to the same degree
in both these applications. First, governments are to seek a “balance of
concessions” during rounds of trade liberalization in the sense that they
cut tariffs reciprocally. While this application is considered to be an
11 This stark result emerges because production relocations are the only motivation for
protection in this environment. In the presence of tariff revenue, the noncooperative
equilibrium involves less than maximum protection, as I discuss in detail in the quantitative
application in Sec. III. Nevertheless, the noncooperative equilibrium remains inefficient
in this case since tariffs continue to entail a production relocation externality.
12 Recall that the iceberg trade barriers assumption restricts tariffs to be nonnegative.
Lemma 2 therefore characterizes a constrained efficiency frontier. This feature should be
kept in mind when comparing this efficiency frontier to the Mayer locus featuring in the
neoclassical theory of GATT/WTO negotiations.
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important negotiation norm in practice, it is actually not encoded in
GATT/WTO articles and is therefore not binding in a legal sense. Sec-
ond, governments are entitled to “withdraw substantially equivalent con-
cessions” if a trading partner increases previously bound tariffs in the
sense that they retaliate reciprocally. This right is encoded in GATT/
WTO articles and therefore has legal status. In light of this discussion,
I adopt the following formal definition of reciprocity, where de-MTBj
notes the difference between the value of country j’s manufacturing
exports and imports.13
Definition 1. Define a tariff change to be reciprocal if it is such
that .M MdTB p dTB p 01 2
Notice first that the principle of reciprocity completely eliminates all
trade policy externalities. Given aggregate manufacturing market clear-
ing, the number of manufacturing firms operating in country j can be
decomposed as follows:
MmL  TBj jn p . (10)j qp
The numerator is just the total expenditure on country j’s manufactur-
ing goods since this can be decomposed into the total expenditure on
country i’s and country j’s manufacturing goods by country j’s consumers
( ), plus the total expenditure on country j’s manufacturing goodsmLj
by country i’s consumers (manufacturing exports of country j), minus
the total expenditure on country i’s manufacturing goods by country
j’s consumers (manufacturing imports of country j). The denominator
is just the (constant) sales of country j’s manufacturing firms. Hence,
if is fixed by reciprocity, country j’s number of manufacturing firmsMTBj
is fixed as well. Intuitively, tariff-induced changes in country j’s consumer
expenditure toward or away from country j’s manufacturing goods are
then exactly offset by tariff-induced changes in country i’s consumer
expenditure away from or toward these goods. This result is summarized
as lemma 3.14
Lemma 3. Tariff changes leave the number of firms unchanged in
both countries if and only if they are reciprocal.
13 While I follow Bagwell and Staiger’s (1999) interpretation of the principle of reci-
procity, I adapt their formal definition to my specific setting by applying it only to man-
ufacturing trade. This adaptation makes it distinct from the definition used by Bagwell
and Staiger (2001b) in the comparable “outside good” setting since they continue to
include nonmanufacturing trade.
14 Of course, reciprocal tariff changes leave the number of firms unchanged in both
countries only if the world number of manufacturing firms is independent of trade policy.
This is the case in this environment but depends on functional form assumptions. More
generally, the principle of reciprocity prevents countries from gaining at the expense of
one another by ruling out changes in the manufacturing trade balance that shift expen-
diture away from one country’s manufacturing sector toward the other country’s manu-
facturing sector.
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Proof. Follows immediately from equation (10) and the definition of
reciprocity. QED
Observe second that reciprocal tariff concessions increase welfare
monotonically in both countries. Recall that a country’s price index is
affected by its own tariff through two opposing effects: the production
relocation effect, which tends to make a country’s price index decreasing
in its own tariff; and the import price effect, which tends to make a
country’s price index increasing in its own tariff. As was discussed above,
the production relocation effect dominates the import price effect so
that a country’s price index is decreasing in its own tariff. However, if
the production relocation effect is eliminated by reciprocity, only the
import price effect remains so that a country’s price index then becomes
increasing in its own tariff. While the details of lemma 3 again reflect
specific modeling assumptions, this result captures a second funda-
mental point: the principle of reciprocity makes countries internalize
the production relocation externality by ruling out changes in the man-
ufacturing trade balance that shift expenditure away from one country’s
manufacturing sector toward the other country’s manufacturing sector.
It is therefore stated as proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Reciprocal trade liberalization monotonically in-
creases welfare in both countries.
Proof. Follows immediately from lemma 3 and the definitions of man-
ufacturing price indices. QED
Notice finally that the principle of reciprocity therefore not only
guides countries away from the inefficient noncooperative equilibrium
in a way that monotonically increases welfare in all countries but also
secures negotiated tariff concessions by eliminating all incentives to
reverse them. Suppose that, starting at the noncooperative equilibrium,
country j assumes the leadership in trade negotiations. Then, since
country i is to respond reciprocally to any tariff reduction by country
j, that is, since country i is to seek a “balance of concessions,” country
j immediately has an incentive to initiate reciprocal trade liberalization,
which monotonically increases welfare in both countries. Also, since
country i is entitled to respond reciprocally to any tariff increase by
country j, that is, since country i is entitled to “withdraw substantially
equivalent concessions,” country j never has an incentive to increase its
tariff so that negotiated tariff concessions can be secured.15 In summary,
15 Thus, any tariff combination can be sustained under reciprocity in this environment.
Together with lemma 2, this result implies that all efficient tariff combinations can be
sustained under reciprocity. This finding differs from the finding of Bagwell and Staiger
(1999) that, in the absence of political economy forces, free trade is the only efficient
tariff combination that can be sustained under reciprocity. Recall, however, that lemma
2 characterizes constrained efficient tariffs so that this difference should not be over-
emphasized.
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the principle of reciprocity can thus be seen as helping governments
escape the inefficient noncooperative equilibrium in a way that mono-
tonically increases welfare in all countries.16
B. Three-Country Case: GATT/WTO and Nondiscrimination
While the basic two-country model is useful to illustrate the role played
by the GATT/WTO principle of reciprocity, it is too simple to shed light
on the role played by the GATT/WTO principle of nondiscrimination.
For this reason, I now consider an extension of this model. In particular,
I focus on the simplest possible setup that allows for discriminatory tariff
setting. There are now three countries. Country 1 trades with both 2
and 3, but country 2 and country 3 trade with 1 only. Hence, only country
1 can set discriminatory tariffs.
All results regarding noncooperative trade policy naturally generalize
to the three-country case. Most important, the noncooperative equilib-
rium is still inefficient because tariffs entail a production relocation
externality that governments fail to internalize when setting tariffs non-
cooperatively. Readers interested in the details of the noncooperative
equilibrium can find the solution of the three-country model together
with the three-country versions of lemma 1, lemma 2, and proposition
1 in the Appendix.
However, this similarity conceals that tariffs now have more compli-
cated international implications. Besides the import price effect, there
is now both a bilateral and a multilateral production relocation effect.
The bilateral production relocation effect acts between the two countries
directly affected by the tariff and is just the production relocation effect
familiar from the two-country model. The multilateral production re-
location effect is an additional effect on the third country, which works
through changes in country 1’s manufacturing price index.
The presence of this multilateral production relocation effect implies
that the key properties of the principle of reciprocity generalize to the
three-country case only if countries engage in multilateral trade nego-
tiations. To establish this, I adapt the earlier definition of reciprocity to
the three-country case. Tariff changes must now be bilaterally reciprocal
in bilateral trade negotiations and multilaterally reciprocal in multilat-
eral trade negotiations, where bilaterally reciprocal and multilaterally
reciprocal tariff changes are formally defined as follows.
Definition 2. Define a tariff change to be bilaterally reciprocal be-
tween country 1 and country 2 if it is such that and bilaterallyMdTB p 02
16 In fact, the principle of reciprocity not only helps governments escape the inefficient
equilibrium but also directly guides them to efficient tariffs. The reason is that countries
can liberalize their trade reciprocally unless one country has completely eliminated all its
tariffs, which is sufficient for efficiency from lemma 2.
gatt/wto negotiations 135
reciprocal between country 1 and country 3 if it is such that MdTB p3
. Define a tariff change to be multilaterally reciprocal if it is such that0
.M M MdTB p dTB p dTB p 01 2 3
Now, the principle of reciprocity eliminates all trade policy external-
ities only if it is applied in multilateral trade negotiations. Given aggre-
gate manufacturing market clearing, the number of manufacturing
firms operating in country j can again be decomposed as follows:
MmL  TBj jn p . (11)j qp
Hence, if country 1 and country 2 change tariffs in a bilaterally recip-
rocal way, the number of firms in country 2 remains unchanged. There-
fore, the principle of reciprocity eliminates the bilateral production
relocation effect if it is applied in bilateral trade negotiations. Also, if
all countries change tariffs in a multilaterally reciprocal way, the number
of firms remains unchanged in all countries. Therefore, the principle
of reciprocity eliminates both the bilateral and the multilateral pro-
duction relocation effect if it is applied in multilateral trade negotia-
tions. Although not obvious from equation (11), the principle of reci-
procity is not sufficient to also eliminate the multilateral production
relocation effect if it is applied in bilateral trade negotiations. The rea-
son is that bilaterally reciprocal tariff changes between country 1 and
country 2 change country 1’s price index, thereby affecting the prof-
itability of firms in country 3. For example, a bilaterally reciprocal trade
liberalization between country 1 and country 2 reduces the price index
in country 1. This makes it harder for firms in country 3 to sell their
products to country 1 so that production relocations from country 3 to
country 1 have to occur in equilibrium. This result is summarized in
lemma 4.
Lemma 4. Tariff changes leave the number of firms unchanged in
all countries if and only if they are multilaterally reciprocal. Moreover,
bilaterally reciprocal trade liberalization between country 1 and country
2 leaves the number of firms unchanged in country 2 but monotonically
increases the number of firms in country 1 at the expense of country
3. Similarly, bilaterally reciprocal trade liberalization between country
1 and country 3 leaves the number of firms unchanged in country 3
but monotonically increases the number of firms in country 1 at the
expense of country 2.
Proof. See the Appendix for a formal proof.
Moreover, the principle of reciprocity now ensures that negotiated
tariff concessions increase welfare monotonically in all countries only
if it is applied in multilateral trade negotiations. If country 1 and country
2 liberalize in a bilaterally reciprocal way, country 2 gains because of
the import price effect, country 1 gains because of the import price
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effect and the multilateral production relocation effect, but country 3
loses because of the multilateral production relocation effect. If, instead,
country 1, country 2, and country 3 liberalize in a multilaterally recip-
rocal way, all countries gain because of the import price effect. This
result is summarized in proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Multilaterally reciprocal trade liberalization mono-
tonically increases welfare in all countries. Moreover, bilaterally recip-
rocal trade liberalization between country 1 and country 2 monotoni-
cally increases welfare in country 1 and country 2 but monotonically
decreases welfare in country 3. Similarly, bilaterally reciprocal trade
liberalization between country 1 and country 3 monotonically increases
welfare in country 1 and country 3 but monotonically decreases welfare
in country 2.
Proof. See the Appendix for a formal proof.
Hence, the principle of reciprocity now helps countries overcome the
inefficient noncooperative equilibrium in a way that monotonically in-
creases welfare in all countries only if it is applied in multilateral trade
negotiations. This observation suggests that an important role played
by the principle of nondiscrimination is to multilateralize trade nego-
tiations. Under the principle of nondiscrimination, country 1 has to
impose the same tariff against country 2 and country 3 so that country
1 cannot change its tariff against country 2 or country 3 only. As a
consequence, country 2 and country 3 are then both authorized to
respond to any tariff change by country 1 in a way that keeps their
manufacturing trade balances unchanged so that multilateral reciprocity
prevails.17
It is important to emphasize that, according to this interpretation,
the principle of reciprocity alone continues to reverse all incentives for
protection so that the principle of nondiscrimination plays no efficiency-
enhancing role. Instead, it ensures only that all trade policy externalities
are eliminated so that governments cannot gain at the expense of one
17 This simple interpretation actually squares well with the justification given by U.S.
Secretary of State Cordell Hull for making the principle of nondiscrimination a corner-
stone of the U.S. Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 on which the GATT/WTO is
largely based. As summarized by Bagwell and Staiger (2002, 72), Hull regarded the prin-
ciple of nondiscrimination as beneficial “since it offered a way to multilateralize the re-
ciprocal tariff reductions that governments might negotiate bilaterally.” Notice that coun-
tries do not necessarily have an incentive to engage in multilateral trade negotiations. For
example, it is easy to show that country 1 would always prefer sequential bilateral trade
negotiations to simultaneous multilateral trade negotiations in the special case of sym-
metric countries. The reason is that country 1 gains only because of the import price
effect in simultaneous multilateral trade negotiations but also because of the multilateral
production relocation effect in sequential bilateral trade negotiations. GATT/WTO articles
allow countries to sign preferential trade agreements as an important exception to the
principle of nondiscrimination. This exception has generated a debate on whether pref-
erential trade agreements are “building blocks” or “stumbling blocks” on the way to mul-
tilateral free trade. See Panagariya (2000) for a survey of the literature.
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another and welfare increases monotonically in all countries during all
stages of the liberalization process.18
III. Quantitative Application
In this section, I calibrate a more realistic version of the basic model
and present my quantitative results. This version is more realistic in four
ways. First, there are now J countries and trade can flow between all of
them. Second, tariffs now generate revenue that is distributed in a lump-
sum fashion to consumers. Third, production and trading technologies
are now asymmetric in the sense that marginal costs c and fixed costs
f are allowed to vary across countries and transport costs v are allowed
to vary across exporter-importer pairs. Finally, there are now aggregate
trade imbalances captured by an exogenous trade surplus parameter
. Everything else is just as in the basic model.TBj
For given tariffs, the model’s solution is now determined by the fol-
lowing equations, which represent manufacturing market-clearing con-
ditions, manufacturing price index definitions, and consumer expen-
diture conditions, respectively:
J
j 1j j j1q p p v t G mX , ip 1, … , J, (12)i i ij ij j j
jp1
1/(1j)
J
1jG p n (p v t ) , jp 1, … , J, (13)j i i ij ij[ ]
ip1
J
1j j j1X p L  TB  t n (p v ) t G mX , jp 1, … , J. (14)j j j ij i i ij ij j j
ip1
18 Notice that the principle of nondiscrimination plays a different role in Bagwell and
Staiger (1999). There, it does not neutralize the multilateral terms-of-trade effect by mul-
tilateralizing trade negotiations but instead by equalizing all bilateral terms of trade. In
fact, multilateralizing trade negotiations would not be sufficient to neutralize the multi-
lateral terms-of-trade effect because the multilateral terms of trade are a trade-weighted
average of the bilateral terms of trade and thus depend on trade shares unless the bilateral
terms of trade are equalized. One implication of this difference is that the principles of
reciprocity and nondiscrimination neutralize all third-party externalities without requiring
any third-party response in Bagwell and Staiger (1999). Notice that reciprocal trade lib-
eralization no longer necessarily leads to efficient tariffs if the principle of nondiscrimi-
nation is imposed. The reason is that reciprocity and nondiscrimination can be satisfied
only if all tariffs are lowered simultaneously, as can be easily established by differentiating
the three-country versions of the manufacturing market-clearing conditions. But this is
impossible if at least one of the tariffs is equal to zero, which is not sufficient for efficiency,
as can be seen from the three-country version of lemma 2. Recall, however, that the
requirement to liberalize reciprocally is not binding in a legal sense so that this feature
of the principle of nondiscrimination should not be overemphasized.
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The key difference compared to the basic model is that consumer ex-
penditure now consists of labor income minus the aggregate trade sur-
plus plus tariff revenue necessitating the introduction of the consumer
expenditure variable and the consumer expenditure condition (14).19Xj
Denoting the counterfactual value of by and counterfactual changes′t tij ij
in by and so forth, one can easily verify using′ˆt t { (1 t )/(1 t )ij ij ij ij
the technique of Dekle et al. (2007) that equations (12)–(14) can be
rewritten in changes as
J
j j1ˆ ˆ
ˆ1p a (t ) (G ) X , ip 1, … , J, (15) ij ij j j
jp1
1/(1j)
J
1jˆ
ˆ ˆG p b n(t ) , jp 1, … , J, (16)j ij i ij[ ]
ip1
J
′ j j1ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆX p g  d t n(t ) (G ) X , jp 1, … , J, (17)j j ij ij i ij j j
ip1
where , , , and are simple functions of m, tariffs, and trade flowsa b g dij ij j ij
only.20 In particular, , , , anda { T /S b { t T /mX g { (X  R )/Xij ij i ij ij ij j j j j j
, where denotes the total value of trade flowing fromd { T /X Tij ij j ij
country i to country j evaluated at world prices; denotes theJS {  Ti ijjp1
total value of manufacturing sales of firms from country i evaluated at
world prices; denotes the total expenditure of con-JX { (1/m) t Tj ij ijip1
sumers in country j; and denotes the tariff revenue ofJR {  t Tj ij ijip1
country j. Given estimates of m and j as well as data on tariffs and trade
flows only, equations (15)–(17) can be used to compute the counter-
factual changes in manufacturing price indices , numbers of manu-ˆGj
facturing firms , and consumer expenditures induced by counter-ˆnˆ Xi j
factual tariffs . Counterfactual changes in welfare can then be′tij
calculated from since indirect utility is now given bymˆˆ ˆV p X (G )j j j
.m 1m mV p m (1 m) X Gj j j
I use trade and tariff data for the year 2004. I focus on the main
players in recent GATT/WTO negotiations—Brazil, China, the Euro-
pean Union, India, Japan, and the United States—and aggregate all
other countries into a seventh trade bloc, which I refer to as the rest
19 Also, and are now country specific since marginal costs and fixed costs are allowedq pj j
to vary across countries, is exporter-importer pair specific, and enters only with av tij ij
coefficient of j into the manufacturing market-clearing condition since it is no longer
part of the iceberg trade barriers and therefore does not generate any indirect demand.
20 Caliendo and Parro (2010) were the first to apply the technique of Dekle et al. (2007)
to an analysis of tariff changes.
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TABLE 1
Aggregated Trade Matrix from Dekle et al. (2007)
ROW
European
Union Brazil China India Japan
United
States
ROW 3,907.4 551.6 15.1 434.4 20.4 91.2 550.8
European Union 656.9 6,372.9 14.3 83.6 16.9 48.3 235.9
Brazil 24.1 9.3 314.6 2.1 .3 1.0 16.4
China 349.7 161.6 3.9 801.7 7.0 82.4 212.2
India 18.6 17.3 .4 6.2 387.0 1.4 14.6
Japan 191.8 96.1 2.9 123.1 2.9 3,074.1 128.4
United States 390.4 177.4 10.7 45.6 5.5 44.0 5,201.3
Note.—Entry (i, j) is factual exports from i to j in US$ billions in 2004.
TABLE 2
Aggregated Tariff Matrix from Boumellassa et al. (2009)
ROW
European
Union Brazil China India Japan
United
States
ROW .0 2.5 12.7 4.2 14.8 1.3 2.2
European Union 7.0 .0 12.7 4.2 14.8 1.3 2.2
Brazil 7.0 2.5 .0 4.2 14.8 1.3 2.2
China 7.0 2.5 12.7 .0 14.8 1.3 2.2
India 7.0 2.5 12.7 4.2 .0 1.3 2.2
Japan 7.0 2.5 12.7 4.2 14.8 .0 2.2
United States 7.0 2.5 12.7 4.2 14.8 1.3 .0
Note.—Entry (i, j) is the factual tariff imposed by j against imports from i in percent
in 2004.
of the world (ROW).21 I construct the matrix of trade flows exactly as
in Dekle et al. (2007) and also work with their parameter estimates
and or, alternatively, .22 I construct themp 0.188 jp 9.28 jp 4.60
matrix of tariffs by taking simple averages over the applied manufac-
turing protection rates reported by Boumellassa, Laborde, and Mitari-
tonna (2009).23 I present my trade and tariff data in tables 1 and 2.
Before I implement the full seven–trade bloc case, it is instructive to
turn to a simple two–trade bloc example to illustrate the implications
of tariff revenue and to motivate the algorithm used for computing
21 I aggregate Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom
into the European Union since these were the member states at the beginning of 2004.
The European Union is a customs union and therefore sets a common external tariff. I
include Hong Kong in my definition of China.
22 In particular, I downloaded their GDP data, trade balance data, and international
trade data from the Web site of Sam Kortum and followed their exact procedure to
compute internal trade flows. Notice that m compares to a in their paper and j compares
to in their paper.1 v
23 Consistent with the principle of nondiscrimination, these manufacturing protection
rates vary by importer only.
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Fig. 1.—Optimal tariff with tariff revenue
Nash tariffs. I generate such an example by keeping the United States
only and aggregating all other countries into the rest of the world. Figure
1 shows how U.S. welfare varies in the U.S. tariff and reveals that there
is now an interior optimal tariff. The reason is that tariff revenue is
hump shaped in the tariff and the welfare loss due to a reduction in
tariff revenue dominates the welfare gain due to additional production
relocations at some point. Figure 2 plots the U.S. optimal tariff against
the tariff of the rest of the world and vice versa, suggesting that Nash
tariffs can be computed using a simple iterative algorithm. In particular,
the Nash equilibrium can be found by first computing the U.S. optimal
tariff given a guess of the rest of the world’s optimal tariff, then com-
puting the rest of the world’s optimal tariff given the U.S. optimal tariff,
and so on, as this procedure quickly converges to the point at which
both reaction functions cross. Both figures take all factual tariffs to be
zero for simplicity and focus on the case only but look similarjp 9.28
under alternative assumptions.
Tables 3 and 4 report the Nash tariffs for the full seven–trade bloc
case computed using this simple algorithm under the assumption of
and , respectively. Nash tariffs are predicted to bejp 9.28 jp 4.60
relatively similar across trade bloc pairs. They range between 10.3 per-
cent and 13.0 percent in the case of and between 25.6 percentjp 9.28
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Fig. 2.—Reaction functions and Nash equilibrium
and 28.9 percent in the case of . The tariffs observed duringjp 4.60
the trade war following the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 are typically
reported to be around 50 percent (see, e.g., Bagwell and Staiger 2002,
43). While a direct comparison is difficult given the differences in the
set of players and the timing of the experiment, it is still noteworthy
that my stylized production relocation model generates Nash tariffs that
have the same order of magnitude as these actual noncooperative tariffs.
In contrast, the stylized terms-of-trade model calibrated by Perroni and
Whalley (2000) predicts Nash tariffs of up to 1,000 percent.24
Table 5 presents the counterfactual welfare changes from moving to
the predicted Nash tariffs. They range between 0.01 percent and 0.36
percent in the case of and between 0.05 percent and 1.20jp 9.28
percent in the case of . With the exception of the United States,jp 4.60
all countries are always predicted to be strictly worse off in the case of
a tariff war. It is well known from Kennan and Riezman (1988) that big
countries can win a tariff war since their tariffs inflict large externalities
24 To the best of my knowledge, Perroni and Whalley (2000) is the only quantitative
study of noncooperative trade policy that has a scope similar to that of the analysis provided
here. Earlier studies such as Whalley (1985, 231–49) were forced to restrict attention to
simple two-country cases because of computational constraints faced at the time.
TABLE 3
Nash Tariffs with j p 9.28
ROW
European
Union Brazil China India Japan
United
States
ROW .0 13.0 12.1 11.6 12.0 12.4 12.4
European Union 11.0 .0 12.1 11.9 12.0 12.1 12.0
Brazil 11.6 12.5 .0 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.3
China 10.3 11.5 12.0 .0 12.0 12.5 10.9
India 12.2 12.5 12.1 12.0 .0 12.1 12.1
Japan 11.3 12.0 12.1 11.6 12.1 .0 11.9
Unitd States 11.4 12.1 12.1 12.0 12.1 12.1 .0
Note.—Entry (i, j) is the counterfactual Nash tariff imposed by j against imports from
i in percent.
TABLE 4
Nash Tariffs with j p 4.60
ROW
European
Union Brazil China India Japan
United
States
ROW .0 28.7 27.8 26.2 27.7 28.3 27.8
European Union 26.3 .0 27.7 27.6 27.8 27.8 27.7
Brazil 26.7 28.2 .0 27.6 27.8 27.9 27.8
China 28.4 26.9 27.7 .0 27.7 28.9 25.6
India 27.5 28.0 27.8 27.5 .0 27.8 27.6
Japan 26.6 27.5 27.8 26.9 27.8 .0 27.5
United States 27.0 27.8 27.8 27.8 27.8 27.9 .0
Note.—Entry (i, j) is the counterfactual Nash tariff imposed by j against imports from
i in percent.
TABLE 5
Welfare Losses from Moving to Nash Tariffs
j p 9.28 j p 4.60
Nash Autarky Relative Nash Autarky Relative
ROW .28 1.19 23.31 .65 2.23 29.22
European Union .03 .41 6.42 .18 .86 21.20
Brazil .12 .67 18.68 .34 1.13 30.18
China .36 1.94 18.77 1.20 3.97 30.36
India .12 .66 19.07 .34 1.08 31.60
Japan .08 .39 20.87 .30 .87 34.86
United States .01 .35 3.06 .05 .71 6.49
Note.—Entries under Nash are counterfactual welfare changes from moving to Nash
tariffs, in percent; entries under Autarky are counterfactual welfare changes from moving
to autarky, in percent; and entries under Relative are entries under Nash relative to entries
under Autarky, in percent (computed from nonrounded values).
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on other countries. Countries are typically said to win a tariff war if they
are better off under noncooperative tariffs than under free trade. Table
5, instead, states that the United States may be better off under non-
cooperative tariffs than under factual tariffs. Notice that factual tariffs
are relatively low for the United States so that the United States also
simply has a lot of room to increase tariffs in case of a tariff war.
Table 5 also reports the counterfactual welfare changes from moving
to autarky and puts the counterfactual welfare changes from moving to
the predicted Nash tariffs in relation to them. These ratios range be-
tween 3.06 percent and 23.31 percent in the case of andjp 9.28
between 6.49 percent and 34.86 percent in the case of . Onjp 4.60
average, the losses from moving to Nash tariffs amount to a sizable
fraction of the losses from moving to autarky. Notice that these ratios
are robust to misspecifications of the model if these misspecifications
affect the losses from moving to Nash tariffs and the losses from moving
to autarky proportionately. One apparent misspecification is the absence
of intermediate goods. Intermediate goods are difficult to include in
the specific setup developed here since they turn the model into a
version of the Krugman and Venables (1995) “new economic geography”
model featuring multiple equilibria if a reasonable value for manufac-
turing value added is chosen.25
While tariffs have already been cut substantially as a result of GATT/
WTO negotiations, the model suggests that there is still room for further
Pareto-improving tariff changes. Suppose, for example, that countries
implement tariff changes that maximize the mean welfare change sub-
ject to the constraints that no welfare change is negative and no tariff
is negative. In the case of , the resulting mean welfare increasejp 9.28
is predicted to be 0.11 percent. In the case of , it is predictedjp 4.60
to be 0.09 percent.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, I developed a novel theory of GATT/WTO negotiations
based on the Krugman (1980) new trade model. Unlike the standard
terms-of-trade theory, it emphasizes international production reloca-
tions and is easy to calibrate to bilateral trade data. Focusing on the
major players in recent GATT/WTO negotiations, I found that it implies
25 In particular, entry leads to a reduction in the price index due to an increase in the
number of goods. Without intermediate goods, this decreases profits only by increasing
competition and thereby discourages further entry. With intermediate goods, however, it
also increases profits by reducing costs and thereby encourages further entry. If inter-
mediate goods are sufficiently important, the latter effect dominates, which gives rise to
a process of cumulative causation. Notice that the absence of wage effects makes this
scenario particularly likely in the specific setup developed here.
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reasonable noncooperative tariffs and moderate gains from GATT/
WTO negotiations.
Many of the arguments made in the context of the neoclassical theory
of GATT/WTO negotiations could be revisited in the context of this
new trade theory of GATT/WTO negotiations. For example, one could
introduce political economy forces into the model as in Bagwell and
Staiger (1999) to see whether GATT/WTO negotiations can be viewed
as a response to politically motivated protectionism. Or one could con-
sider labor and environmental standards as in Bagwell and Staiger
(2001a) to assess whether they should be part of the GATT/WTO agree-
ment. Or one could introduce domestic production subsidies into the
model as in Bagwell and Staiger (2006) to evaluate the GATT/WTO
rules on production subsidies.
Appendix
A. Basic Model: Two-Country Case
1. Parameter Restrictions
The manufacturing sector is active in both countries for all possible if(t , t )21 12
and only if and . The nonman-1/(1j) 1/(1j)v ≥ [L /(L  L )] v ≥ [L /(L  L )]1 1 2 2 1 2
ufacturing good sector is active in both countries for all possible if and(t , t )21 12
only if .1jm ≤ 1 v
2. Proof of Lemma 2
A tariff combination cannot be Pareto efficient if there exist possible(t , t )21 12
Pareto-improving tariff changes at . This includes tariff(dt , dt ) (t , t )21 12 21 12
changes such that and . From total differentiation,(dt , dt ) dG ! 0 dG p 021 12 2 1
G G1 1dG p dt  dt1 21 12
t t21 12
and
G G2 2dG p dt  dt .2 21 12
t t21 12
Therefore, ifdG p 01
t G21 1dt p dt21 12
G t1 12
so that
G G t G2 2 21 1dG p  dt2 12( )t t G t12 21 1 12
along . Notice thatdG p 01
G G t G2 2 21 1 1 0
t t G t12 21 1 12
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for all . The reason is that(t , t )21 12
jG (vt vt ) vt1 21 12 12p vG ,11jt 1 (vt vt )21 21 12
1j jG [1 (vt ) ](vt )1 21 12p vG ,11j 1jt [1 (vt ) ][1 (vt vt ) ]12 12 21 12
1j jG [1 (vt ) ](vt )2 12 21p vG ,21j 1jt [1 (vt ) ][1 (vt vt ) ]21 21 21 12
jG (vt vt ) vt2 21 12 21p vG21jt 1 (vt vt )12 21 12
so that
G G t G G2 2 21 1 2 p .
t t G t t12 21 1 12 12
Hence, there exist Pareto-improving tariff changes for all .(dt , dt ) (t , t )21 12 21 12
These are such that and and are thus possible if and(dt , dt ) dt ! 0 dt ! 021 12 21 12
only if and . Therefore, only such that either ort 1 0 t 1 0 (t , t ) t p 021 12 21 12 21
or both can be Pareto efficient. It is easy to verify that for none of theset p 012
does there exist another that makes one country better off(t , t ) (t , t )21 12 21 12
without making the other country worse off. Therefore, they are also indeed
Pareto efficient. QED
B. Basic Model: Three-Country Case
1. Parameter Restrictions
The manufacturing sector is active in all countries for all possible ( , , ,t t t21 31 12
) if and only if , , and1/(1j) 1/(1j)t v ≥ [L /(L  L  L )] v ≥ [L /(L  2L )]13 1 1 2 3 2 1 2
.26 The nonmanufacturing good sector is active in all1/(1j)v ≥ [L /(L 2L )]3 3
countries for all possible ( , , , ) if and only if .1jt t t t m ≤ 1 2v21 31 12 13
2. Solution for Given Trade Policy
For given tariffs, the model’s solution is determined by the manufacturing
market-clearing conditions
j j1 j 1j j1 j 1j j1qp p G mL  p (vt ) G mL  p (vt ) G mL , (A1)1 1 12 2 2 13 3 3
j 1j j1 j j1qp p (vt ) G mL  p G mL , (A2)21 1 1 2 2
26 Notice that this restriction gets stronger the more countries are featured in the
analysis. It should, however, not be taken literally empirically since wage adjustments are
ruled out in order to cleanly isolate production relocation effects. If positive profits could
also be competed away by wage adjustments instead of entry, a milder parameter restriction
would be sufficient to guarantee diversified manufacturing production.
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j 1j j1 j j1qp p (vt ) G mL  p G mL , (A3)31 1 1 3 3
where and as in the two-country case, but the idealq{ f(j 1)/c p{ jc/(j 1)
manufacturing price indices are now given by
1j 1j 1j 1/(1j)G { [n p  n (pvt )  n (pvt ) ] ,1 1 2 21 3 31
1j 1j 1/(1j)G { [n (pvt )  n p ] ,2 1 12 2
1j 1j 1/(1j)G { [n (pvt )  n p ] .3 1 13 3
Equations (A1)–(A3) can be solved immediately for the equilibrium manufac-
turing price indices
j 1/(j1)qp F1G p , (A4)1 ( )mL Q1
j 1/(j1)qp F2G p , (A5)2 ( )mL Q2
j 1/(j1)qp F3G p , (A6)3 ( )mL Q3
where
1j 1jF { 1 (vt )  (vt ) , (A7)1 12 13
1j 1j 1j 1jF { 1 (vt )  (vt ) [(vt )  (vt ) ], (A8)2 21 13 31 21
1j 1j 1j 1jF { 1 (vt )  (vt ) [(vt )  (vt ) ], (A9)3 31 12 21 31
1j 1jQ{ 1 (vt vt )  (vt vt ) . (A10)21 12 31 13
It is easy to verify that F1, F2, F3, and given the assumed parameter re-Q 1 0
strictions. If the definitions of manufacturing price indices are substituted, they
can also be solved for the equilibrium numbers of manufacturing firms:
1j 1jm L L (vt ) L (vt )1 2 21 3 31n p   , (A11)1 [ ]qp F F F1 2 3
1j 1j 1jm L [1 (vt vt ) ] L (vt vt ) L (vt )2 31 13 3 12 31 1 12n p   , (A12)2 { }qp F F F2 3 1
1j 1j 1jm L [1 (vt vt ) ] L (vt vt ) L (vt )3 21 12 2 21 13 1 13n p   . (A13)3 { }qp F F F3 2 1
As in the two-country case, the world number of manufacturing firms is constant,
tariffs affect welfare only through the manufacturing price indices, and there
can be no role for terms-of-trade effects.
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3. Three-Country Version of Lemma 1
Suppose that governments choose tariffs simultaneously in an attempt to max-
imize their citizens’ welfare. Then the unique Nash equilibrium is ( , , ,t t t21 31 12
) p ( ).t t, t, t, t13
Proof. Follows immediately from equations (A4)–(A6). QED
4. Three-Country Version of Lemma 2
The set of Pareto-efficient tariff combinations consists of all ( , , , ) sucht t t t21 31 12 13
that either or or both.t p t p 0 t p t p 012 13 21 31
Proof. A tariff combination ( , , , ) cannot be Pareto efficient if theret t t t21 31 12 13
exist possible Pareto-improving tariff changes ( , , , ) at ( , ,dt dt dt dt t t21 31 12 13 21 31
, ). This includes tariff changes ( , , , ), , sucht t dt dt dt dt dt p dt p 012 13 21 31 12 13 31 13
that and . From total differentiation,dG ! 0 dG p dG p 02 1 3
G G1 1dG p dt  dt ,1 21 12
t t21 12
G G2 2dG p dt  dt ,2 21 12
t t21 12
G G3 3dG p dt  dt .3 21 12
t t21 12
Therefore, ifdG p 01
t G21 1dt p dt21 12
G t1 12
and ifdG p 03
t G21 3dt p dt .21 12
G t3 12
Notice that these two conditions are identical. The reason is that
jG (vt vt ) vt1 21 12 12p vG ,1
t Q21
jG F (vt )1 2 12p vG ,1
t QF12 1
j 1jG F (vt vt ) vt (vt )3 1 21 12 12 31p vG ,3
t QF21 3
j 1jG F (vt ) (vt )3 2 12 31p vG3
t QF12 3
so that
t G t G21 1 21 3 p .
G t G t1 12 3 12
Hence, along ,dG p dG p 01 3
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G G t G2 2 21 1dG p  dt .2 12( )t t G t12 21 1 12
Notice that
G G t G2 2 21 1 1 0
t t G t12 21 1 12
for all ( , , , ). The reason is thatt t t t21 31 12 13
jG (vt vt ) vt2 21 12 21p vG2
t Q12
and
1j jG F [1 (vt vt ) ](vt )2 1 31 13 21p vG ,2
t QF21 2
which, together with the derivatives given above, implies that
G G t G G2 2 21 1 2 p .
t t G t t12 21 1 12 12
Hence, there exist Pareto-improving tariff changes ( , , , ),dt dt dt dt21 31 12 13
, such that and for all ( , , , ).dt p dt p 0 dG ! 0 dG p dG p 0 t t t t31 13 2 1 3 21 31 12 13
These ( , , , ) are such that and and are thus possibledt dt dt dt dt ! 0 dt ! 021 31 12 13 21 12
if and only if and . This also includes tariff changes ( , ,t 1 0 t 1 0 dt dt21 12 21 31
, ), , such that and . From totaldt dt dt p dt p 0 dG ! 0 dG p dG p 012 13 31 12 2 1 3
differentiation,
G G1 1dG p dt  dt ,1 21 13
t t21 13
G G2 2dG p dt  dt ,2 21 13
t t21 13
G G3 3dG p dt  dt .3 21 13
t t21 13
Therefore, ifdG p 01
t G13 1dt p dt13 21
G t1 21
and ifdG p 03
t G13 3dt p dt .13 21
G t3 21
Notice that these two conditions are identical. The reason is that
jG F (vt )1 3 13p vG1
t QF13 1
and
jG (vt vt ) vt3 31 13 31p vG ,3
t Q13
which, together with the derivatives given above, implies that
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t G t G13 1 13 3 p .
G t G t1 21 3 21
Hence, along ,dG p dG p 01 3
G G t G2 2 13 1dG p  dt .2 21( )t t G t21 13 1 21
Notice that
G G t G2 2 13 1 1 0
t t G t21 13 1 21
for all ( , , , ). The reason is thatt t t t21 31 12 13
j 1jG F (vt ) (vt )2 3 13 21p vG ,2
t QF13 2
which, together with the derivatives given above, implies that
jG G t G F (vt )2 2 13 1 1 21 p vG .2
t t G t F21 13 1 21 2
Hence, there exist Pareto-improving tariff changes ( , , , ),dt dt dt dt21 31 12 13
, such that and for all ( , , , ).dt p dt p 0 dG ! 0 dG p dG p 0 t t t t31 12 2 1 3 21 31 12 13
These ( , , , ) are such that and and are thus possibledt dt dt dt dt ! 0 dt ! 021 31 12 13 21 13
if and only if and . Symmetric arguments can be made for tarifft 1 0 t 1 021 13
changes ( , , , ), , such that anddt dt dt dt dt p dt p 0 dG ! 0 dG p21 31 12 13 21 12 3 1
and tariff changes ( , , , ), , such thatdG p 0 dt dt dt dt dt p dt p 02 21 31 12 13 21 13
and . Therefore, only ( , , , ) such that eitherdG ! 0 dG p dG p 0 t t t t3 1 2 21 31 12 13
or or both can be Pareto efficient. It is easy to verifyt p t p 0 t p t p 012 13 21 31
that for none of these ( , , , ) does there exist another ( , , , )t t t t t t t t21 31 12 13 21 31 12 13
that makes one country better off without making at least one of the other
countries worse off. Therefore, they are also indeed Pareto efficient.
5. Three-Country Version of Proposition 1
The noncooperative equilibrium is inefficient.
Proof. Follows immediately from the three-country versions of lemmas 1 and
2. QED
6. Proof of Lemma 4
The statement that tariff changes leave the number of firms unchanged in all
countries if and only if they are multilaterally reciprocal follows immediately
from equation (11) and the definition of multilateral reciprocity. Similarly, the
statement that bilaterally reciprocal trade liberalization between country 1 and
country 2 (country 3) leaves the number of firms unchanged in country 2
(country 3) follows immediately from equation (11) and the definition of bi-
lateral reciprocity. Finally, the statement that bilaterally reciprocal trade liber-
alization between country 1 and country 2 (country 3) monotonically increases
the number of firms in country 1 at the expense of country 3 (country 2) follows
from the fact that together with the observation thatdn  dn  dn p 01 2 3
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if ( if ),dn /dt 1 0 dt p dt p dn p 0 dn /dt 1 0 dt p dt p dn p 03 21 31 13 2 2 31 21 12 3
which can be easily established from equation (A3) (eq. [A2]). QED
7. Proof of Proposition 3
Follows immediately from lemma 4 and the definitions of manufacturing price
indices. QED
C. Effects of t r 
If , the two-country version of lemma 1, the three-country version of lemmat r 
1, lemma 4, and proposition 3 would have to be modified as follows.
Effect on the two-country version of lemma 1.—If , ( ) would no longer bet r  t, t
the unique Nash equilibrium but instead the unique trembling-hand perfect
Nash equilibrium. In particular, if and ifG /t r 0 t r  G /t r 01 21 12 2 12
, as can be seen from equations (6) and (7). Therefore, all sucht r  (t , t )21 21 12
that or would then also be Nash equi-(t , t )p (any t , t) (t , t )p (t, any t )21 12 21 21 12 12
libria. However, only ( ) would be robust to small perturbations in the gov-t, t
ernments’ strategies because as soon as and asG /t ! 0 t !  G /t ! 01 21 12 2 12
soon as .t ! 21
Effect on the two-country version of lemma 1.—This is analogous to the effect on
the two-country version of lemma 1. If , ( ) would no longer be thet r  t, t, t, t
unique Nash equilibrium but instead the unique trembling-hand perfect Nash
equilibrium since all other Nash equilibria would not be robust to small per-
turbations in the governments’ strategies.
Effect on lemma 4.—If , the statement on bilaterally reciprocal trade lib-t r 
eralization would have to be qualified. In particular, bilaterally reciprocal trade
liberalization between country 1 and country 2 would then leave the number
of firms unchanged in country 2 but increase the number of firms in country
1 at the expense of country 3 if and leave the number of firms unchangedt ! 31
in all countries if . The latter case arises becauset r  G /t p31 3 21
if , as can be seen from equation (A6). Similarly, bilaterallyG /t p 0 t r 3 12 31
reciprocal trade liberalization between country 1 and country 3 would then leave
the number of firms unchanged in country 3 but increase the number of firms
in country 1 at the expense of country 2 if and leave the number of firmst ! 21
unchanged in all countries if . The latter case arises becauset r 21
if , as can be seen from equation (A5).G /t p G /t p 0 t r 2 31 2 13 21
Effect on proposition 3.—This follows directly from the effect on lemma 4. If
, the statement on bilaterally reciprocal trade liberalization would have tot r 
be qualified. In particular, bilaterally reciprocal trade liberalization between
country 1 and country 2 would then monotonically increase welfare in country
1 and country 2 but monotonically decrease welfare in country 3 if andt ! 31
monotonically increase welfare in country 1 and country 2 but leave welfare
unchanged in country 3 if . Similarly, bilaterally reciprocal trade liber-t r 31
alization between country 1 and country 3 would then monotonically increase
welfare in country 1 and country 3 but monotonically decrease welfare in country
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2 if and monotonically increase welfare in country 1 and country 3 butt ! 21
leave welfare unchanged in country 2 if .t r 21
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